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 The Dual-Agency Problem Reconsidered: A Strategic Deviance Perspective  
on the Franchise Form of Organizing 
Abstract 
Drawing on various theoretical streams, including organizational deviance, we propose that a 
franchisor cannot assess and control opportunism without comparative information from 
plural form contractual arrangements provided by both franchisee relationships and operating 
its own units.  Moving beyond dyadic perspectives, our strategic deviance model suggests 
why franchisors accept deviant behavior that results from vertical and horizontal agency 
problems.  The plural form provides benchmark information to the franchisor that curbs even 
greater levels of costly shirking and free riding behaviors.  Thus, company manager and 
franchisee opportunism is managed through self enforcing social control, tournaments in 
internal quasi-markets and social comparison mechanisms. 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, the burgeoning organizational deviance literature has focused on 
classifying deviant behavior in terms of its positive or negative, constructive or destructive, 
beneficial or dysfunctional effects on employees, firms and society (e.g., Bennett & 
Robinson, 2000; Warren, 2003; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2003; 2004).  Meanwhile, 
franchising research has often employed an agency perspective to examine specific elements 
of what is regarded as negative dysfunctional behavior – shirking and free riding – and 
downplayed the potentially positive effects of these deviant behaviors in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship (e.g., Michael, 2000; Combs, Michael & Castrogiovanni, 2004; 
Kidwell, Nygaard & Silkoset, 2007).  Rarely has deviance or franchising research explicitly 
acknowledged the positive effects of negative examples of deviant behaviors.         
   We propose that what are generally seen as destructive and dysfunctional behaviors 
have constructive and functional effects on the quality of organizational control, performance 
and survival in the context of the plural form of organizing (Dant, Perrigot & Cliquet, 2008; 
Makadok & Coff, 2009), providing a rationale as to why these behaviors are accepted and 
thus potentially take on an ambiguous character when examined in the franchising context. 
Deviance and Franchising                                               3  
Whereas shirking and free riding behaviors would not be regarded as positive deviance 
(Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2003; 2004) nothwithstanding their potentially useful effects, we 
explain why they are tolerated and potentially encouraged in franchisor-franchisee 
relationships despite being labeled as challenging to the relationship, i.e., the dual-agency 
problem (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs, et al , 2004).      
 In proposing the usefulness of a strategic justification of shirking and free riding to 
the franchisor, we expand the examination of franchising relationships from agency issues to 
consider the importance of transaction costs and multi-agent contracts.  We demonstrate how 
a plural form organization (Bradach, 1997; Cliquet, 2000; Parmigiani, 2007; Dant, Perrigot & 
Cliquet, 2008; Makadok & Coff, 2009) acts to temper opportunism in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship by the counterintuitive use of  deviant behavior. We explain why 
plural forms achieve efficient control and effective performance and expand worldwide, 
despite having vertical and horizontal agency problems (Rubin, 1978; Brinkley & Dark 1987; 
Combs, Michael & Castrogiovanni, 2004).  Using a strategic deviance perspective, we show 
how theories that have not yet been applied to franchising expand franchising knowledge and 
propose conditions in which franchising potentially aids such performance elements as 
growth, efficiency, and company owned and franchised outlet success. 
  Thus, this paper contributes to theories of workplace deviance and franchising as 
follows: 1) We extend work place deviance theory to consider ambiguous elements of 
deviance rather than classifying deviance as purely positive or negative forms  2) We explain 
why the plural form tolerates negative deviance due to its potential for positive effects on the 
firm, demonstrating how the plural model of franchise organizing employs deviant behavior 
for constructive outcomes and showing how franchisees help franchisors beyond managing 
local operations 3)  We provide a basis for extending research beyond agency and resource 
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scarcity explanations for plural forms in franchising (Combs & Ketchen, 2003) by applying 
theories of workplace deviance and social comparison to explanations of franchise operations  
4) Finally, we contend future research can better enhance organizational knowledge by 
employing a multi-agent perspective rather than limiting theoretical and empirical inquiry to 
consideration of principal/agent dyads, which has not been fully adequate from a strategic 
perspective. 
Workplace Deviance: Bad, Good and Ambiguous 
 Workplace deviance has been defined as “voluntary behavior that violates significant 
organizational norms and, in doing so, threatens the well-being of the organization or its 
members, or both” (Bennett & Robinson, 2000:349).  An alternative view of deviant behavior 
defined it as behavioral departures from the norms of a reference group (Warren, 2003).  In 
some cases, researchers identified the behavior as socially or organizationally harmful (e.g., 
aggression, lying, theft, misbehavior, sabotage, political activity and noncompliance to rules 
or norms) and in other instances identified the behavior as socially or organizationally 
beneficial (e.g., tempered radicalism, whistle-blowing, exercising voice and counterrole 
behavior) leading Warren (2003) to propose a typology in which organizational behaviors 
could conform or deviate from normative expectations and could be constructive or 
destructive either at the reference group level (organizational standards) or globally held 
beliefs and standards (hypernorms).  Destructive deviance violates both reference group 
norms and hypernorms, and constructive deviance violates reference group norms but not 
hypernorms.  On the other hand, constructive conformity violates neither set of norms, and 
destructive conformity violates hypernorms but not reference group norms (Warren 2003). 
 Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2003, 2004) developed a normative approach to the 
positive deviance construct by defining it as an honorable, voluntary departure from the 
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norms of a referent group.  They also developed research propositions that proposed 
differences between positive deviance and related prosocial types of behaviors, including 
organizational citizenship, whistle-blowing, corporate social responsibility, and innovation.  
For example, organizational citizenship behaviors and positive deviant behaviors are related, 
yet distinct, because the firm bears few costs when OCBs occur and potentially large costs 
when positive deviant behaviors occur because such behaviors entail a drastic departure from 
organizational norms (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004).  
Research into negative deviant behaviors has been conducted in recent years under 
various terms that generally refer to the same types of behaviors (e.g., Ackroyd & Thompson 
1999; Bennett & Robinson 2003; Giacalone & Greenberg 1997; Kidwell & Valentine, 2009; 
Sackett 2002, Vardi & Weitz  2004).  Anti-organizational behaviors and opportunistic acts 
that prove costly to firms – such as lying, insubordination, misuse of information, sabotage, 
gambling, harassment, theft, aggression, drug/alcohol abuse, free riding and shirking – have  
been classified as instances of negative deviance.  
 Our focus in this paper is on two of these types of negative behavior: shirking and free 
riding.  Shirking is defined as an internal agent’s failure to provide full effort on a job-related 
task.  Free riding is defined as an external agent’s lowering of service or product quality to 
cut costs and obtain indivisible benefits from being a member of the group without bearing a  
proportional share of the costs) (cf., Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Bennett & Naumann, 2005; 
Vardi & Weitz, 2004).    Shirking occurs when employee agents without an ownership stake 
shirk duties because their incomes are not tied to their efforts thus creating a vertical agency 
problem, and free riding is present when non-firm owner agents reduce contributions so as to 
benefit from the efforts of other affiliated outlets or the company resulting in a horizontal 
agency problem for the firm.  In previous research, shirking has been linked to franchisor 
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managers and employees whereas free riding has been linked to franchisees (Combs, et al 
2004); both types of these deviant behaviors are related to incentives and monitoring costs.  
We focus on these two negative types of behaviors because in the plural form franchise 
organization they can have negative consequences at the individual and unit levels of analysis 
while offering mixed outcomes when considered at the organizational level.   
Plural Forms in Franchising and the Nexus of Contracts 
 Although existing theory explains strategic choices among alternative organizational 
forms (e.g., Williamson, 1991) and the mechanism of a bilateral exchange is said to 
determine the most effective form of organizational control, whether it be market- or 
hierarchy-based (Ouchi, 1979), firms strategically organize multiple agents simultaneously in 
different ways even when technology and market segments are identical.  This choice often 
involves a plural form of organizing (Bradach, 1997; Cliquet, 2000; Parmigiani, 2003; 2007; 
Dant, Perrigot & Cliquet, 2008; Baker & Dant, 2008; Makadok & Coff, 2009).  Plural form 
organizations can combine vertical integration, licensing, long-term contracts, joint ventures, 
global coalitions, dynamic networks and other types of alliances (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) 
and have been explored empirically and theoretically (e.g., Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Bradach, 
1997, 1998; Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999b; He & Nickerson, 2006; Lafontaine & Kaufman, 
1994; Michael, 2000; Shane, 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001; Windsperger, 
2004; Yin & Zajac, 2004; Srinivasan, 2006; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; 
Bürkle & Posselt, 2008; Makadok & Coff, 2009; Castrogiovanni & Kidwell, 2010).  Using a 
mix of internal agents and contracted units to deliver services fosters learning, innovation and 
the transmission of important values and perspectives across different groups (Sanyal, 2006).  
 The business format franchise industry characterizes the plural form as franchisees 
(dealer owned and operated) and franchisors (company owned and operated) (International 
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Franchise Association, 2009).  Almost all companies that operate franchise systems run their 
own units; e.g., McDonalds has about 20 percent company-owned units (6815) and 80 
percent franchised units (24,624) and Hilton Hotels has about 55 percent company owned 
units (293) and 45 percent franchised properties (231) (International Franchise Association, 
2009).  In the plural organization, internal managers/company employees and external 
agents/franchisee employees simultaneously carry out the same standardized operations on 
behalf of the firm, creating a hybrid market/hierarchical organizational form (cf., Cliquet, 
2000).   
 The plural model is similar to the concept of  tapered integration  (Porter, 1980, 
Harrigan 1984), which was expanded to the franchising industry in Michael (2000). Tapered 
integration refers to backward or forward integrated firms that rely on outside companies for 
supplies or distribution (Porter, 1980; Harrigan, 1984).  This arrangement is a compromise 
between a need to be strategically flexible and a desire to control adjacent businesses by  
allowing a firm to monitor research and development of outside companies, lower problems 
of  strikes and shortages in their systems, and take advantage of lower costs (Harrigan, 1984). 
 In applying this concept to franchising, Michael (2000) argued that tapered integration 
in the form of franchisor owner-operated outlets gives the franchisor an ability to gain 
operational knowledge and measure relative performance of franchisees (Anand, 1987; 
Bradach, 1997).  The franchisor gains information regarding franchisee activities and 
demonstrates that the franchisor can further integrate if needed, a credible threat giving the 
franchisor bargaining power with the franchisee.  Ownership allows a franchisor to better 
forecast costs of quality improvements and provides a franchisor with information regarding 
preferences of its customers and demand levels (Minkler, 1992; Michael, 2000).  
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Whereas Michael (2000) demonstrated that tapered integration provides synergies 
through bargaining power and credible threats of further integration, an implication is that 
one or a few internally owned units would be sufficient to reap these benefits.  We build on 
Michael’s work by explaining why in most circumstances franchisors operate 20 to 60 
percent of the total units in the franchise system.  In some cases, the greater the number of 
internal units, the more valid the information provided about quality production that signals 
standard quality across the brand, helping to control free riding by franchisees.  In addition, 
access to information from the franchisees helps monitor the franchisor-owned units, thus 
assisting in controlling opportunistic activities by company managers.  
We propose that the owned and franchise units know that the principal (franchisor) 
can gauge their relative performance, thus comparative information creates an even broader 
base of  “credible threats.” Whereas Michael may imply that the franchisor only compares the 
owned units with the franchisees, we propose that this comparison goes both ways.  In the 
model we describe in this paper, we link two conceptual avenues that establish these threats 
in terms of comparative information: social comparison theory based on experience, norms 
and social structure in the network and benchmarking through market information. Both give 
the agents (franchisor or franchisee) impulses about how they rank their own behavior versus 
other agents in the franchise network. We propose that this is an effective way of agent 
monitoring - they actually monitor themselves based on comparative information about the 
other (owned and franchisee) agents in the network.  
 Williamson (1999) suggests that research in transaction costs economics increased 
interest in the post-contract problems that arise from the nature of transactions and the 
involvement of human actors. Such views of organizational systems suggest a strong focus on 
systems of multiple agents rather than relationships in individual dyads.  A systems approach 
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opens a complementary view instead of a competing perspective among alternatives 
presented by existing theories of organizing.  A review of transactions costs theory by David 
and Han (2004: 54)  reflected on the background of mixed empirical support for transactions 
cost analysis, stating that “a simple plea for more empirical work may not be enough, for it is 
quite likely to reproduce the same mixed results on an enlarged scale.”  A more recent meta-
analysis concluded that transactions cost theory only begins to explore organizational forms 
and suggested that researchers expand beyond a dyadic focus to consider network 
perspectives on organizations (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006: 533).   
 Following Williamson (1999:1100), we propose such a dynamic perspective to 
consider franchise organizing: The franchisor firm is a nexus of contracts resulting from a 
number of dyadic pre-contract decisions.  We argue that such a make-and-buy form is a 
favored governance mechanism across different types of organizations because through the 
use of strategic deviance it produces, processes and compares information crucial to govern 
the entire network, enhancing the prospect of organizational learning and performance (cf., 
Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001).  As Bradach (1997, 1998) noted, a focus on single dyads misses 
the strategic dimension important in principal/multi-agent relationships. 
  Michael (2000) presents the benefits of having internal units, but the fundamental 
motivation problem that company-owned units represent (shirking) should be explored 
further. Internal units respond to quality restrictions in the contract, but are in general less 
effective because of the more prevalent nature of fixed, rather than performance-based, 
compensation systems. This compensation scheme makes internal units less motivated to 
direct behavior to effective activities including effort levels. This is one key reason why 
franchising systems use franchisees. In an owner/operated business, shirking occurs; 
franchising helps control shirking.  Our model presents a way of looking at the economy of 
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information that makes it possible to control both shirking and free riding/quality 
simultaneously in the system by making a strategic decision to organize in a way that permits 
both forms of deviance to exist.   
The plural make-and-buy organizational form has been closely related to the global 
expansion of the service industry driven by franchising as a key growth strategy.  We propose 
that use of strategic deviance in the plural form is in part due to the character of service 
industry “production” as a limited-time interaction between agent and consumer, which adds 
to information asymmetry and information superiority enjoyed among agents at the expense 
of the franchisor firm’s ownership of the brand capital.  To control such information 
superiority, the franchisor firm needs a system that contributes to the validity of comparative 
information received from both internal and external agents.  In addition, the strategic 
deviance model proposed in this paper adds perspectives to existing theory through a make 
and buy, multi-agent approach that is generally ignored in previous organizational research.   
Strategic Deviance in Franchising: Why and When 
 Most format franchise systems are plural networks in which “make and buy” is the 
rule, rather than the exception.  Therefore, franchising research for a long time has been 
puzzled by this emerging and highly relevant fact (Lafontaine & Kaufman, 1994; Dahlstrom 
& Nygaard, 1999b Windsperger & Dant, 2006). The rapid global expansion of plural formed 
franchise systems fuels theoretical speculation.  As a result, we present a strategic deviance 
model that merges network perspectives, social comparison theory (O`Reilly et al. 1988), 
social control (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), and 
organizational deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Warren, 2003).   
 To address why companies organize agent relationships in various ways, it is fruitful 
to analyze the complex nature of multiple contractual relationships by extending the 
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dimensions that can characterize the principal-agent relationship.  Our model starts with a 
perspective that emphasizes the need to step away from a focus on internal and external 
agents as mutually exclusive ways of organizing transactions (Bradach & Eccles, 1989).  
Instead, we adopt a network of transactions perspectives (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991) 
where aspects of transactions serve as complementary approaches to explain inter-
organizational pluralism. Constructing a viable theory to explain plural system structures in 
franchising differs from existing perspectives in two respects.  The plural model of strategic 
deviance, detailed in Figure 1, enables a firm to control both shirking and free riding by 
giving the organization unique access to crucial information – in the form of comparative 
quality and comparative efficiency  – about the specific problems of alternative contracts.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The model emphasizes the interaction between different contracts (Bradach & Eccles, 
1989) by focusing less on a specific dyad and more on how the strategic management of an 
organizational set of plural contracts affects multiple agents and deviant behavior, i.e., 
opportunism within the entire system.  Assuming that the market selection process produces 
the most efficient organizational forms, the growth of format franchising worldwide in the 
last few decades may reflect superior efficiency relative to alternative institutional structures 
(Alchian, 1950; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  The superior growth and survival rate of global 
franchise systems, we argue, can be explained by the ability of the plural firm to organize so 
as to control various types of costly deviant behavior.   
 Plural systems can be effective and efficient organizations because of plural 
governance costs and structures, not in spite of different contractual formations, given a 
standard technology, as follows from micro-analytic theory.  The interaction between 
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different contracts provides synergistic effects due to separate and contract-related ways to 
withhold effort.  To show how plural contracts can create efficiencies, we apply examples of 
agent opportunism.  Different contracts produce different incentives and chances for 
opportunism (Rubin, 1978; Brickley & Dark, 1987; Katz, 1989; Tirole, 1988).  Thus, 
integration shifts incentives for deviant behavior, but it does not remove these incentives 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986).  Deviant behavior through opportunism is rooted in the incentive 
structure in the contract: The compensation scheme, authority structure, and the organization 
of transactions (Williamson, 1975).  When contracts change, so does behavior. Thus, 
received theories on economic organization are “less convincing in arguing that transacting 
through a hierarchical organization lessens transaction costs” (Kreps, 1990: 97).  Kreps’s 
(1990) questions why internal transaction costs are lower relative to market transactions. 
Eccles and White’s (1988) qualitative research on internal transfer pricing adds power to the 
argument. 
Buy Option 
 Polar inter-organizational structures can be illustrated and analyzed by considering 
them as make-or-buy decisions.  The “buy” option, i.e., use of external agents, is outcome-
dependent, for instance, the franchisees in a franchise system, a sales person or an 
independent distributor. Nevertheless, as noted, delegation of brand reputation to external 
agents may lead to free riding (Michael, 2002).  Companies with strong brand names have 
long needed to be concerned that poor service quality in one outlet or by one agent will 
reflect badly on the image of the entire chain or network (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).  
 An external agent may reduce its own costs and increase its own profits by cutting 
product- and service-quality and thereby “cheat” the principal (brand owner) and the other 
agents in the system.  Brand name reputation of a franchise chain, which is supposed to 
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guarantee quality to customers, requires close control of agent operations. Therefore, brand 
name chains can be seen as counteracting institutional effects of quality uncertainty (Akerlof, 
1970).  The chaotic and uncertain market created a demand for brand capital that signaled and 
safeguarded quality when “brand names not only indicate quality but also give the consumer 
a means of retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations” (Akerlof, 1970: 500). 
  However, consumer retaliation may hurt other agents operating under the brand than 
the ones that have damaged the brand. The plural model describes how the costs of 
monitoring brand representation can be lower by operating both internal and external agents.  
When it is costly to represent a brand and the risk of consumer retaliation to the single agent 
is low, the external agent may tend to underrepresent quality image of the brand. Thus,  
Proposition 1: Franchisees (external agents) free ride to a greater degree than company 
managers (internal agents).  
Make Option 
 Using the “make” option, the firm can change the incentives that lead to free-riding 
problems like reduced product and service quality by defining contracts that emphasize 
internal authority relative to outcome dependency, a focus on predictability and control (Yin 
& Zajac, 2004). Here, the agent’s compensation is no longer connected to outcome (i.e. sales) 
but to input efforts to safeguard quality brand image of the network (for instance, the number 
of work hours/days, amount of correspondence, number of accounts, calls made, number of 
accounts, service preferred, closing ability, presentation quality, product knowledge, etc.) 
(Jackson, Keith & Schlacter, 1983).  Consequently, there are no motives to cheat other parties 
in the system by free riding.  So the company can safeguard and develop the quality image in 
the brand through its internal units without degrading brand capital. 
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 However, internalizing agents does not cure deviant behavior.  Whereas the agent 
may be positively motivated by elements of authority in the contract to affect his/her efforts 
by increasing quality input of production, i.e. take part in non-selling activities like promoting 
new products, demonstrations etc., the internal agent may not be motivated to operate 
efficiently if it is not specified in the contract. In addition, fixed salary schemes produce 
incentives to shirk when monitoring of the agent is problematic (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
 The separation of organizational ownership of brands and agent decision control when 
monitoring is problematic produces agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Neither external 
nor internal agents make decisions fully consistent with a firm’s intentions because of the 
agents’ information superiority. Closely intertwined with the delegation problems are the 
costs of opportunism. Thus, “integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and 
distortionary behavior, but it does not remove these incentives (Grossman & Hart, 1986: 
716). Solving one agency problem of free riding produce another serious agency problem of 
shirking. Consequently,  
Proposition 2: Company managers (internal agents) tend to shirk more than franchisees 
(external agents).  
How Strategic Deviance Exerts Comparative Control on Opportunism  
 We propose that the employment of strategic deviance in the franchise form allows  
agents (both company managers and franchisees) to relate their behavior not only to the 
principal-agent contract, but to a process of ongoing comparisons to other agents belonging to 
the plural system. All agents interact more or less, i.e. like franchise units within a franchise 
system. Comparative information is the outcome of these horizontal interactions. The 
franchise units may compare their efforts, benefits and performance to other franchise units in 
the neighborhood or to other units in their social network. Horizontal formal or informal 
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communication between agents produces the basis for comparison among agents (Mohr & 
Nevin, 1990).  
 In a competitive world, the access to this benchmark information is an important 
disciplinary device within the franchise system. Some companies stimulate this self enforcing 
benchmark control by publishing score boards on a regularly basis (e.g., sales per square foot 
for each store in retailing). Availability of comparative efficiency benchmarks therefore 
affects and adjusts potential shirking behavior among company managers. It supports vertical 
governance and control in the system. Comparative control of quality signaled by the brand 
may be affected by both formal and informal social control. Implicit rules about quality 
benchmarks develop through horizontal interaction in the plural system. Because company 
agents have few incentives to free ride by underrepresenting the brand quality, these units are 
essential to build benchmark quality norms of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.  
 Consequently, the model proposes that the franchise organization controls 
opportunism by using both market-oriented tournaments and social comparison mechanisms 
as background for established quality and efficiency benchmarks.  The organization provides 
efficiency information that controls shirking problems as well as effort-based experience that 
managers might apply to control free riding through social comparison. Horizontal 
benchmark control adds comparative information and benchmarks to vertical goverenance. 
Comparative information and benchmark control therefore curb both types of ex post 
opportunism associated with internal and external agents. Thus, this view of the plural form 
may explain previous findings (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1994) that 
different types of contracts were equally effective.  
 By using both types of incentive systems, the franchisor economizes on control costs 
when monitoring agents is costly and hard to enforce. The firm has various alternatives for 
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redefining the incentive structure in the inter-organizational contract. Redefinition of a single 
contract is based on comparable information from both company managers and franchisees.  
From operating their own units, the franchisor learns how to define input quality standards 
that can be  controlled through social comparison and tournaments.  From sufficient internal 
operations, the firm knows the details of franchisee operations and so acquires necessary 
information to compare and control them. Thus, the system supports itself through horizontal 
benchmark control, tournament market control, social comparison control and social control. 
Whenever a franchisee free rides on quality standards, the franchisor can give penalties or in 
extreme circumstances take over agent operations (Michael, 2000).  Social control regimes 
through comparative benchmarks may lead to perceived potential sanctions like collegial 
disapproval, criticism, discrimination and exclusion. 
 The most efficient company managers may be given outcome-related economic 
rewards.  One way of stimulating benchmark control is to publish input and output measures 
from external and internal agents in the system on a scoreboard.  This makes market-based 
comparison control a self-enforcing reward structure (Becker & Huselid, 1992).  A firm can  
define benchmarks by “making known on a regular basis the achievements of both agents and 
direct sales personnel” (Lawrence & Lawrence, 1982: 57).  The company may also introduce 
both types of agents to more monitoring, control, and restricted flexibility. To guard the 
system against “lemon” franchisees, the franchisor must define hire, fire and penalty options 
in the contract. Success of this strategy is driven by the credible threats perceived by agents 
in the network (Michael, 2000). 
 As noted, plural systems have unique access to comparative information that makes 
the principal less vulnerable to the agents’ informational superiority. When a network has the 
capacity to control agency costs we theorize that this structure has impact on overall long-
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term performance. That we observe the global growth of plural formed networks may 
indicate that such organizations are more effective because of lower agency costs than both 
integrated systems and networks that operate only with external agents (Alchian, 1950). 
 Following the proposition that a plural network serves dual objectives to control both 
quality efforts associated with the brand (Akerlof, 1970) and output (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1990), the plural franchise form applies comparative control related to the market in which 
the agent operates and to the social comparison inherent within internal social processes in 
the network. The plural organization contributes to the principal’s capacity to process 
information critical to control different agents. On one hand, Lazear & Rosen (1981) propose 
market-oriented tournament control as a disciplinary device. The tournament perspective 
argues that the principal can control agency problems by rewarding agents based on how well 
they perform relative to other agents within the network (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  As a result, 
market forces control shirking behavior most likely to appear within company owned and 
operated units.  The market approach to comparative control applies outcome variables that 
can be easily observed, evaluated, and applied to control shirking. Therefore,  
Proposition 3: Plural forms in franchising relationships produce comparative efficiency 
information that benchmarks and controls shirking among internal agents.  
 
 Both internal managers and franchisees perceive that company access to comparative 
benchmarks control both shirking and free riding simultaneously. On the other hand, the 
franchisor achieves increased informational power when owning units because these units 
represent a source of knowledge of quality standards and a training system that make the 
company capable of implementing those standards (Michael, 2000).  For instance, 
McDonald`s CEO emphasized the firm maintains a global base of company owned and 
operated restaurants to “link our interest with franchisees, develop management talent, gather 
research, and test ideas for better restaurant execution”(McDonald`s Corporation 1995:11).   
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 Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) suggests control is based on internal 
evaluation, observation of similar others and control.  Applying social comparison theory, the 
control processes tend to base evaluations on individual comparisons between agents who are 
slightly different in performance.  Such control systems are experience based where area 
sales managers in a franchise system compare franchisee efforts to their own backgrounds 
and experience.  Previous empirical evidence indicates that external agents employ 
performance-based control systems (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980).  This might indicate that 
control of internal agents is based on information and evaluation of individual efforts more 
than outcome performance (O’Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988).  
  Although, the franchisor’s access to comparative information makes it possible to 
benchmark one agent against the others – the agents also will perceive both input quality and 
output efficiency benchmarks. Therefore, the credible threats of such benchmark controls will 
establish system norms and standards where agents compare each others’ quality and 
efficiency. We argue that implicit understanding of benchmarking among both internal and 
external units powerfully supplements written contracts in the franchise system. The 
benchmarks are self-enforcing powers that control deviant behavior in both internal and 
external units. Both the internal and the external agents know that the system provides 
comparative benchmark information on quality and performance to the franchisor. 
Consequently, they fear the consequences of violating the established standards and are 
disciplined by a motivation to continue the relationship. Thus, 
Proposition 4: Plural forms in franchising relationships produce comparative quality 
information that benchmarks and controls free riding on brand quality among franchisees. 
 
 Information about input to quality production is costly to gather without internal 
company managers.  For instance, Bradach (1997) found that company driven franchise units 
were recruitment bases for company managers.  Applying social comparison theory 
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(Festinger, 1954), control is processed through comparisons between external agent 
performance and a company manager’s own field experience (O‘Reilly, et al., 1988).  This 
improves access to information about how to build trust and reputation in the market.  
 Without this essential field-based knowledge, the company may drift away from the 
dynamics of the market and lack the proper background to control its franchisees.  In 
particular, an organization that rests fully on contracts with external agents to represent its 
brand capital in the market distances itself from customers and thus gradually loses 
competence in how to contract its franchisees without knowledge of the business, technology, 
markets, consumer preferences etc.  For instance, Michael (2000: 500) found indications that 
unit “ownership signals to franchisees that franchisor is committed to quality, that the 
franchisor can recognize quality and that the franchisor can operate a unit if required.”  That 
is, the principal firm operating its own units learns how to produce quality output by being 
closer to the customer.  This is a threat to franchisees who have incentives to free ride on 
quality and thus the collective capital of the brand’s reputation.  For example, comparisons 
can be made between external suppliers and the market. These comparisons can be used to 
discipline internal producers through transfer prices (Walker & Poppo 1991). The key may be 
that the information gained from internal agents is deeper and distinctive and thus allows 
better evaluation of both internal and external sources (Grant 1996) despite a tendency for 
franchisees to free ride and company managers to shirk.     
 Conversely, the costs internal managers’ shirking cannot be evaluated without 
information from franchisees.  A franchisor may compare its franchisee outcome 
performance (i.e. sales, net operating profits, etc.) to its owned and company operated units 
and make  adjustments to improve internal agent performance, similar to what Bradach 
(1997) termed the racheting process.  Therefore, as discussed, information from both internal 
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and external agents produces a reservoir of comparable information related to quality and 
efficiency needed to control all of the agents and ensure consistent performance across 
contracts.   
 Even in a hypothetical situation with one single contractual form where the firm has 
neutral information about the evils of opportunism, the organization is incapable of 
evaluating the relative level of free riding and shirking costs without alternative contractual 
relations as benchmarks. Tournaments within internal markets of both make and buy agents 
reveal potential opportunism. Thus, competitive advantage of the plural franchise system is 
unique access to contractual information that can be used to evaluate costs of different 
contracts and to reformulate and impose new incentives.  Also, the agents assume or perceive 
that the principal has access to information that can benchmark them. Therefore, the access to 
this information is a disciplinary devise that reduces the level of monitoring costs of the 
network:  
Proposition 5: The access to both comparative quality and comparative efficiency 
information reduces the level of monitoring costs and increases the level of performance in 
the franchise network. 
 
 Although potentially tempered and controlled by the level of the appropriate 
benchmarking, the two different dimensions of opportunistic behaviors produced by the 
different contracts, if left unchecked, can damage long-term performance of the entire 
network (Kidwell, Nygaard & Silkoset, 2007).  However, the logic behind free riding -- the 
self interest seeking motivation to increase agent performance and welfare at the cost of the 
collective brand capital of the entire system – will enhance the external agent’s unit 
performance in the short term. Shirking by internal agents should have the opposite effect on 
unit performance:  
Proposition 6:  The higher the level of shirking by internal agents, the lower the level of 
franchisor unit performance. 
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Proposition 7:  The higher the level of free riding by external agents, the higher the level of 
franchisee short-term performance. 
 
 Based on social comparison theory, agents have a set of expectations based on their 
experience (O`Reilly et al. 1988) that benchmarks their own performance. Input quality 
dimensions therefore establish comparative benchmarks when internal agents compare their 
own performance against other internal agents within the network. When internal agents refer 
their own performance to other external agents (i.e. franchisees) another explicit condition 
play a major role in establishing benchmarks.  Explicit efficiency benchmarks like sales, 
growth or other explicit outcome performance variables create corporate benchmarks. The 
principal brand owner stimulates this comparative benchmark control by explicitly publishing 
comparative efficiency benchmark information.  
 When the external agent (i.e. the franchisee in a franchise network) compares its own 
performance to other internal (i.e. company owned and/or operated) units, comparative 
quality benchmarks are reference levels the principal imposes as standards of the entire 
network (often defined in the franchise operation manuals in franchise systems). Therefore, 
external agents apply comparative quality benchmarks as reference levels when they compare 
their own businesses to internal units owned and operated by the principal brand owner. 
When external units compare their own performance to other external units, they apply 
comparative efficiency benchmarks to find their own relative benefits to the costs of brand 
representation. This is a tournament process among network agents based on explicit and 
relative performance evaluation among external agents (Rosen, 1986). Table 1 summarizes 
how agent comparisons to other network agents leads to perceived comparative benchmarks. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Discussion 
 Franchising is an integral part of entrepreneurship (Kaufman & Dant, 1998), but it can 
create incentives among its various agents to engage in deviant behavior such as free riding 
and shirking.  In this paper, we demonstrate how the concept of strategic deviance, which 
permits both of these types of negative behavior to exist, can result in greater levels of 
performance by using the plural structure to control intensity of opportunism, which is 
common to all firms.  
            Whereas plural forms may be unfamiliar to many entrepreneurs and other business 
practitioners, they have become highly visible organizations through format franchising 
systems.  Although franchising is heavily driven by both internal and external units, a plural 
form that functions with a mix of external and internal agents performing the same work is 
increasingly pervasive and extends beyond franchising.  The approach provided by traditional 
theories makes it necessary to explore plural systems more systematically: conditions in 
which they form, their effects on information flow, their effects on opportunistic behavior 
and their effects on performance across contracts.   In the plural form, we see a strategic 
decision to organize in a way that accepts conditions for deviant behavior to occur with the 
result of curbing even greater levels of deviance.     
     The model advanced here focuses on a network of contracts and not agency theory  
dyads.  Interactions between different contracts and agents is, according to the plural system 
model, the competitive edge relative to other forms of organization.  Tests of the model 
advanced in this paper should eventually move beyond a focus on franching systems to study  
multiple types of organizations and their make and buy relationships.  This would enhance 
theory development and further clarify contributions of the proposed model.     
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 The theoretical development in this study contrasted empirical observations regarding 
plural system growth with the conventional wisdom and empirical status in organizational 
economics.  Inconsistency between theory and empirical research has revealed a need to look 
beyond the economics literature (Eisenhardt, 1989) and include new dimensions in principal-
agent analysis (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990).  Our model reveals the architecture of deviant 
behavior. Opportunism, often a behavioral assumption rather than a concrete contractual 
outcome, is a source of theoretical speculation. Free riding and shirking should not only be  
viewed as negative forms of opportunism but a reservoir for informational comparison in 
plural forms that makes it possible to control opportunism.  Below we focus further on the 
importance of internal-external agent ratios in examining multi-agent approaches to strategic 
organization, limitations of the model and additional suggestions for future research.  
 Based on prior empirical research and theoretical work, we speculate that fewer 
internal agents than external agents can create informational bases to control the free riding 
problem in a plural organization as indicated by the 30 percent internal to 70 percent external 
ownership ratio often reported in the franchising literature (e.g., Dant & Kaufmann, 2003).  
The ratio, though, can vary from firm to firm and from industry to industry.  For example, in 
a study of five restaurant chains, Bradach (1997) found a range from 26% company owned 
stores / 74% franchise units (KFC)  to 65% company owned stores / 35% franchise units 
(Jack in the Box).  In the domestic hotel/motel industry,  plural form patterns vary from 
Holiday Inn Express and Hampton Inn (1-3% company units) to Embassy Suites (49% 
company units) to Motel 6 (80% company units) (International Franchise Association, 2009).  
 In our theoretical analysis, we proposed that the structure of the plural form is a 
function of the value of the comparative benchmark information it produces. This 
comparative benchmark information adds explanations to the global growth of plural formed 
Deviance and Franchising                                               24  
organizations (franchises, transnational alliances, global supplier networks, etc.).  Following 
insights from the plural model, contractual pluralism is a necessary condition to define 
contracts that control opportunistic behavior in the network.  One plausible explanation for 
the growth and success of plural companies may therefore lie in the firms’ superior access to 
agent information. The question posed by Klein, et al. (1978: 326) “what kinds of contracts 
are used for what kinds of activities – and why?” – must be complemented by a multi-agent-
plural form perspective to explain the efficiency of organizational types.   
 Future research in franchisor-franchisee settings must focus on how an optimal 
portfolio of contracts can be designed to create an efficient basis to compare information 
about relative transaction costs within and across industries.  Existing theory assumes the 
firm to be a network of isolated individual dyadic contracts. These contracts are viewed as 
separate entities without comparative interaction.  On the other hand, the “make-and-buy” 
organizational form is driven by managerial intentions not only to realign single contracts but 
to strategically optimize the costs of a network of different contracts. The level of 
comparative information is driven by the ratio of internal to external agents. When the 
franchisor owns and operates more units, all agents perceive more comparative quality 
control. Less principal ownership and operation potentially lead to higher levels of perceived 
control by comparative efficiency.   
 Our theory proposes that the credible threat of comparative benchmark information is 
an implicit disciplinary device.  A related theoretical limitation is a firm’s ability to 
seamlessly reconfigure ratios of company-owned to franchised units as may be required by 
changing industry and organizational conditions.  The model also may be seen to presume 
that transfer of comparable information from franchisees to the franchisor is not without 
significant challenges, such as overcoming political motivations of franchisees to shield 
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performance information that may be detrimental to negotiation of the next contract.  
Empirical evidence indicates that when competition levels are higher, external agents are 
more willing to share information with the organization (Dant & Nasr, 1998).  Yet, the model 
implies that when information is not forthcoming from franchisees, the firm must use internal 
mechanisms to go and get it.           
 Methodologically, the plural model suggests that the level of analysis must focus on 
the entire organization (Evan, 1972) or principal/multiple-agent relationships (Tirole, 1988) 
rather than single dyadic transactions.  Constructing a heterogeneous market for agents within 
the network organization provides the information necessary to evaluate the cost of the use of 
agents.  A nexus of different contracts governs transactions in franchise organizations.  In 
production and distribution that entail transaction specific investments, only the plural 
organization as exemplified by franchising genuinely produces comparative information 
necessary to harness the evils of deviant behavior in driving toward positive organizational 
outcomes.   
 The important issue is not only the absolute level of transactions costs within the 
inter-organizational relationship.  More important, we argue, is a comparison of transactions 
costs among alternative organizational structures.  Comparable information from the agents is 
a basis for effective and efficient strategic management and organizational control.  The 
pluralism can be observed in industries where valuable asymmetric information can be 
revealed from both inside and outside arrangements. The focal organization needs plural 
contractual relations to define efficient incentives and to restructure agent contracts.  
Consequently, internal and external contracts are not mutually exclusive governance 
structures, but complementary formations that employ strategic deviance to overcome 
information asymmetry and control additional opportunism.     
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Figure 1. The plural model of strategic deviance in the franchise system 
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  Other Internal  
Network Agents 
Other External 
Network Agents 
The Franchisor Agent 
Compares Itself to: 
Comparative Quality 
Benchmarks 
Comparative Efficiency 
Benchmarks 
The Franchisee Agent 
Compares Itself to: 
Comparative Quality 
Benchmarks 
Comparative Efficiency 
Benchmarks 
 
Table 1. Benchmark control among agents in a franchise network. 
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